Tag: Mark Roderick

What eBAY Tells Us About Secondary Markets For Private Companies

Posted on by Mark Roderick

This blog was originally written by KorePartner Mark Roderick. You can view the original post here. 

 

The securities of private companies are illiquid, meaning they’re hard to sell.

Since 2017 I’d guess a billion dollars and a million person-hours have been spent by those who believe blockchain technology will create liquidity for private securities. Joining that chorus, a recent post on LinkedIn first noted that trillions of dollars are locked up in private securities, then claimed that blockchain technology (specifically, the technology created by the company posting) could unlock all that value.

This is all wrong, in my always-humble opinion. All that money and all those person-hours are more or less wasted.

My crystal ball is no clearer than anyone else’s. But when I try to believe that blockchain will create active secondary markets I run up against two facts:

  • Fact #1: Secondary markets for private securities have been perfectly legal in this country for a long time, yet there are very few of them.
  • Fact #2: The New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges around the world were vibrant even when they were using little slips of paper.

Those two things tell me that it’s not the technology that creates an active secondary market and hence that blockchain won’t change much.

An active secondary market is created when there are lots of buyers and lots of sellers, especially buyers. When millions of people wanted to buy Polaroid in the 1960s they didn’t care whether Polaroid used pieces of paper or stone tablets. Conversely, put the stock of a pink sheet company on a blockchain and you won’t increase the volume.

As described more fully here, there are a bunch of reasons why there aren’t lots of potential buyers for a typical private company:

  • It probably has a very limited business, possibly only one product or even one asset.
  • It probably has limited access to capital.
  • It probably lacks professional management.
  • Investors probably have limited voting rights.
  • There are probably no independent directors.
  • Its business probably depends on one or two people who could die or start acting like Elon Musk.
  • Insiders can probably do what they want, including paying themselves unlimited compensation.
  • No stock exchange is imposing rules to protect investors.

All that seems obvious now and was obvious in 2017. But now I’m thinking of another company with lessons about secondary markets: eBay.

If there’s anything even less liquid than stock in a private company, it’s a used refrigerator, a bracelet you inherited from your grandmother, the clock you haven’t used for 15 years.

All those things and thousands more were once completely illiquid and therefore worth nothing. eBay changed that, almost miraculously adding dollars to everyone’s personal balance sheet. Just as every ATS operating today seeks to create an active market for securities, eBay created a market for refrigerators, bracelets, and clocks. Quite amazing when you think about it.

eBay didn’t create the market by turning refrigerators, bracelets, and clocks into NFTs. To the contrary, when you sell something on eBay you have to ship it, physically, using the lowest of low technology. eBay created the secondary market simply by connecting buyers and sellers using Web2. Just like another company that has created a pretty active market, Amazon.

If any ATS operating today had a thousandth of the registered users eBay has, its founders and investors would be even rubbing their hands with glee.

As a Crowdfunding advocate, I wonder what the world would look like if all those dollars and person-hours had been spent improving the experience of initial investors rather than pursuing secondary markets and blockchain, things dreams are made of. As the shine comes off blockchain maybe we’ll find out.

The SEC Can Stop Your Regulation A Offering At Any Time

Posted on by Mark Roderick

The SEC has two powerful tools to stop your Regulation A offering anytime.

Rule 258

Rule 258 allows the SEC to immediately suspend an offering if

  • The exemption under Regulation A is not available; or
  • Any of the terms, conditions, or requirements of Regulation A have not been complied with; or
  • The offering statement, any sales or solicitation of interest material, or any report filed pursuant to Rule 257 contains any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
  • The offering involves fraud or other violations of section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933; or
  • Something happened after filing an offering statement that would have made Regulation A unavailable had it occurred before filing; or
  • Anyone specified in Rule 262(a) (the list of potential bad actors) has been indicted for certain crimes; or
  • Proceedings have begun that could cause someone on that list to be a bad actor; or
  • The issuer has failed to cooperate with an investigation.

If the SEC suspends an offering under Rule 258, the issuer can appeal for a hearing – with the SEC – but the suspension remains in effect. In addition, at any time after the hearing, the SEC can make the suspension permanent.

Rule 258 gives the SEC enormous discretion. For example, the SEC may theoretically terminate a Regulation A offering if the issuer fails to file a single report or files late. And while there’s lots of room for good-faith disagreement as to whether an offering statement or advertisement failed to state a material fact, Rule 258 gives the SEC the power to decide.

Don’t worry, you might think, Rule 260 provides that an “insignificant” deviation will not result in the loss of the Regulation A exemption. Think again: Rule 260(c) states, “This provision provides no relief or protection from a proceeding under Rule 258.”

Rule 262(a)(7)

Rule 262(a)(7) is even more dangerous than Rule 258.

Rule 258 allows the SEC to suspend a Regulation A offering if the SEC concludes that something is wrong. Rule 262(a)(7), on the other hand, allows for suspension if the issuer or any of its principals is “the subject of an investigation or proceeding to determine whether a. . . . suspension order should be issued.”

That’s right: Rule 262(a)(7) allows the SEC to suspend an offering merely by investigating whether the offer should be suspended.

Effect on Regulation D

Suppose the SEC suspends a Regulation A offering under either Rule 258 or Rule 262(a)(7). In that case, the issuer is automatically a “bad actor” under Rule 506(d)(1)(vii), meaning it can’t use Regulation D to raise capital, either.

In some ways, it makes sense that the SEC can suspend a Regulation A offering easily because the SEC’s approval was needed in the first place. But not so with Regulation D, and especially not so with a suspension under Rule 262(a)(7). In that case, the issuer is prevented from using Regulation D – an exemption that does not require SEC approval – simply because the SEC is investigating whether it’s done something wrong. That seems. . . .wrong.

Conclusion

As all six readers of this blog know, I think the SEC has done a spectacular job with Crowdfunding. But what the SEC giveth the SEC can taketh away. I hope the SEC will use discretion exercising its substantial power under Rule 258 and Rule 262(a)(7).

 

This post was written by KorePartner Mark Roderick and the original post can be found here. Mr. Roderick is an attorney at Lex Nova Law, where he leads the firm’s Crowdfunding and Fintech practice. He writes a widely-read blog at CrowdfundingAttorney.com and is a featured speaker at Crowdfunding and Fintech events across the country, including New York, Texas, Chicago, and Silicon Valley. Mark is one of the most prominent Crowdfunding and Fintech lawyers in the United States. He represents portals, issuers, and others across the country and around the world.

Using a Transfer Agent Doesn’t Mean You Have a Single Entry on Your Cap Table

Posted on by Mark Roderick

Many issuers are concerned that “Crowdfunding will screw up my cap table.” In response, several Title III funding portals offer a mechanism they promise will leave only a single entry on the issuer’s cap table, no matter how many investors sign up.

The claim is innocuous, i.e., it doesn’t really hurt anybody. But it’s also false.

The claim begins with section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act. Under section 12(g), an issuer must register its securities with the SEC and begin filing all the reports of a public company if the issuer has more than $10 million of total assets and any class of equity securities held of record by more than 500 non-accredited investors or more than 2,000 total investors.

17 CFR §240.12g5-1 defines what it means for securities to be held “of record.” For example, under 17 CFR §240.12g5-1(a)(2), securities held by a partnership are generally treated as held “of record” by one person, the partnership, even if the partnership has lots of partners. Similarly, under 17 CFR §240.12g5-1(a)(4), securities held by two or more persons as co-owners (e.g., as tenants in common) are treated as held “of record” by one person.

With their eyes on this regulation, the funding portals require each investor to designate a third party to act on the investor’s behalf. The third-party acts as transfer agent, custodian, paying agent, and proxy agent, and also has the right to vote the investor’s securities (if the securities have voting rights). The funding portal then takes the position that all the securities are held by one owner “of record” under 17 CFR §240.12g5-1.

Two points before going further:

  • Title III issuers don’t need 17 CFR §240.12g5-1 to avoid reporting under section 12(g). Under 17 CFR §240.12g6(a), securities issued under Title III don’t count toward the 500/2,000 thresholds, as long as the issuer uses a transfer agent and has no more than $25 million of assets.
  • 17 CFR §240.12g5-1(b)(3) includes an anti-abuse rule:  “If the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of holding securities of record is used primarily to circumvent the provisions of section 12(g). . . . the beneficial owners of such securities shall be deemed to be the record owners thereof.”

But put both those things to the side and assume that, by using the mechanism offered by the funding portal, the issuer has 735 investors but only one holder “of record.”

Does having one holder “of record” mean the issuer has only a single entry on its cap table? Of course not. At tax time, the issuer is still going to produce 735 K-1s.

The fact is, how many holders an issuer has “of record” for purposes of section 12(g) of the Exchange Act has nothing to do with cap tables. The leap from section 12(g) to cap tables is a rhetorical sleight-of-hand.

As I said in the beginning, the sleight-of-hand is mostly harmless. Except for some additional fees, neither the issuer nor the investors are any worse off. And the motivation is understandable:  too many issuers think Crowdfunding will get in the way of future funding rounds, even though that’s not true.

Even so, as a boring corporate lawyer and true believer in Crowdfunding, I’m uncomfortable with the sleight-of-hand. When SPVs become legal on March 15th perhaps the market will change.

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