Forbes interview with KoreConX founders

Do you know how to invest in the private capital market?  Not many people do.  It is complicated, requires a lot of paperwork, has low transaction volume, comes with risk and volatility, and not very liquid.

Could distributed ledger technology (DLT) be used to reduce back-office fees and expand the market for this asset class?

I interviewed Oscar Jofre, CEO and co-founder of KoreConX, who believes his platform and infrastructure can help.

KoreConX is a company working to change how businesses raise capital.  Mr. Jofre is an advocate for using DLT to bring transparency to a fractured process.  Mr. Jofre mentioned, “There are over 90,000 companies in our platform from around the globe who have raised more than $6.6 billion. Companies who use the KoreConX platform raised capital working with broker-dealers or direct offerings on their own. We are purely providing the technology to make sure they are fully compliant and to manage the entire process.”

What is the private capital market?  What are the problems?

The private capital market represents companies not publicly traded on stock exchanges. Private funds, venture capital investors, and some mutual funds are typically the main buyers.  Investments can be in new start-up enterprises, mature business, or sometimes struggling firms. This type of asset is considered to be highly risky.

One critical problem, the team at KoreConX explained, was the lack of market access for small firms. Dr. Kiran Garimella, KoreConX’s CSO and CTO, said, “The majority of participants in private capital markets are smaller entities who are closely connected with local companies and investors. They cannot afford huge expenses for integrated systems.”  KoreConX specializes in connecting all sizes of firms rather than limiting their scope to more mature enterprises.  Interestingly CEO Oscar Jofre’s background is crowdfunding, which is a driving influence in his business.

Jason Futko, CFO and co-founder, said, “It is often difficult for companies in the private capital markets to identify investors to present their opportunity. The fragmentation in this market can make it difficult to find investors or other professionals to help you grow your business.”

On June 26th, 2019, Broadridge bought from Northern Trust a similar blockchain platform.  There is competition in this space from many players. Mr. Jofre said, “There are companies like Carta, Capshares, ComputerShare, AST, and Link Group that offer some of the features KoreConX provides in our all-in-one platform. We have a much different view of the market. To truly transform it, we need to make sure all participants have all the tools they need. If they don’t, then we will never see any great change in the private capital markets.”

KoreConX launched on October 11th, 2019, their new blockchain ecosystem for fully compliant digital securities worldwide.  Their mission is to ensure compliance with securities regulation and corporate law.  The KoreConX platform includes securitized token issuance, trading, clearing, settlement, management, reporting, and corporate actions.

As explained to me by the management team, the lack of data integrity and regional knowledge of jurisdictional compliance can restrict investment opportunities offered to the public.  Mr. Futko continued, “Obviously part of the solution under KoreConX has to be around connecting document fragmentation, providing access to professionals and creating trust through our blockchain, which ensures both business and regulatory logic.”

Why can blockchain technology help now?

The KoreConX team stated that the private capital markets serve over 450 million private companies worldwide today.  They have a lack of document transparency and high fees. Compare this to public capital markets, which have established listing standards and rules.  Furthermore, open markets are used every day and can handle many transactions.  Dr. Garimella said, “Blockchain offers technology that provides solid mechanisms for trust through immutability and consensus among parties.”

I asked Mr. Jofre to explain why his work was different from larger companies, like Broadridge? He responded, “KoreConX is entering a market with many providers who have a single feature or application. For private capital markets to be as efficient, as public listed markets, it needs an infrastructure layer and an application layer.  KoreConX brings both.  We do not exclude anyone because of size or geography.”

Wake up call, do you have the right chain for securities?

Polymath is the latest of the Ethereum fan club that has woken up to the fact that Ethereum isn’t the right blockchain platform for financial securities. The reasons include the permissionless and unverified participants, gas fees, unpredictable settlement, poor performance, and lack of scalability.

Vitalik himself was the first to point this out way back on May 9, 2016 (3.5 years ago—a lifetime in crypto-space) in a blog post on Settlement Finality: “This concept of finality is particularly important in the financial industry, where institutions need to maximally quickly have certainty over whether or not the certain assets are, in a legal sense, “theirs”, and if their assets are deemed to be theirs, then it should not be possible for a random blockchain glitch to suddenly decide that the operation that made those assets theirs is now reverted and so their ownership claim over those assets is lost.”

Independently, we (KoreConX) too came to the same conclusion when we first started looking for a good platform for our digital securities and our all-in-one applications that serve the market. This does not detract from the engineering prowess of the Ethereum team, who have taken on a monumental task in trying to create an open blockchain platform that is everything to everyone.

The real problem in the financial markets is that of investor safety. No amount of cryptography can guarantee the validity of participants and of transactions precisely because verification and validity is not in the technical domain. Rather, it’s in the social, economic, and regulatory domain. Blockchain will immutably commit all data regardless of its business validity, as long as it’s cryptographically valid. It is up to the blockchain applications and smart contracts to ensure business validity. This too is not a technical issue but a legal issue. Securities contracts should be authored by securities attorneys, not programmers. Indeed, smart contracts as conceived in Bitcoin and Ethereum are neither smart nor contracts. The word ‘contract’ is an obfuscation of ‘interface specification’ that is commonly referred to as a ‘contract’ between two applications in the software world. Unfortunately, 

To their credit, the thought-leaders of Ethereum were under no illusions about the supposed prowess of smart contracts, as defined within Ethereum. Vitalik Buterin, for example, tweeted back on October 13, 2018, “To be clear, at this point I quite regret adopting the term ‘smart contracts’. I should have called them something more boring and technical, perhaps something like ‘persistent scripts’.” Another Ethereum, Vlad Zamfir, preferred the term ‘stored procedures’.

The most important thing that the open blockchain community missed is that except for currency, financial securities are not bearer instruments. Creating fraudulent securities through shell companies is ridiculously easy with bearer instruments, which is why they are banned in responsible economies.

Besides the fact that securities are not bearer instruments, the public blockchain advocates seem to be coming to the realization that when securities are exchanged between two parties, independent and unverified miners have no business validating the transaction. Parties who have no fiduciary responsibilities, no regulatory mandate, or any skin in the game cannot perform business validation. Would you ask a stranger in New Zealand to approve the transfer of your shares in a private company to your friend when you, your friend, and the private company are all in the USA? As Polymath’s Dossa observers, “How ethereum settles transactions through mining also came into consideration for Polymath, Dossa said. Since miners, who process and sign-off on transactions for a fee, can operate anywhere in the world, institutions could face government scrutiny if fees are traced back to a sanctioned country.” More to the point, securities law does not recognize approvals from parties who are not associated with securities transactions.

Even as the public blockchain community tried to disintermediate regulators, when their assets were stolen from their wallets and exchanges, or the companies vanished outright, investors turned to those same regulators for recourse and recovery.

The other problematic aspect of Ethereum was the nature of finality, which in Ethereum, is statistical. This will not do in legal agreements. As we pointed out early last year in one of our KoreBriefings when evaluating Ethereum, “Finality [in Ethereum] if probabilistic and not guaranteed.” Would you sign an employment agreement where the fine print says there’s a one-in-ten chance that you would not be paid every two weeks. As Adam Dossa, Polymath’s head of blockchain, rightly observed, “At the center of contention is ethereum’s consensus mechanism, proof-of-work (PoW), which only offers a statistical guarantee of transaction finality.”

Incentives often have unintended consequences. We see this happen often with children and pets. Public blockchains are all about decentralization, but in fact miners’ incentives have all but centralized the blockchains. In contrast, consider that within KoreChain we have not left the question of decentralization to the vagaries of unknown miners. Instead, the KoreChain is engineered for decentralization. It is an implementation of the Infrastructure of Trust that currently runs in production in twenty-three countries; in barebones minimal cruising mode, it is capable of handling approximately 10 billion transactions per year (~318 tps) with consensus on business validity. KoreChain’s architecture also makes it massively scalable with very little effect on performance. However, as Vitalik rightly points out, finality can never be 100% even if the technology can achieve absolute finality, since the ultimate arbiter of finality is the legal system. For this reason, KoreChain includes KoreNodes independently are owned and operated independently by regulated entities and regulators worldwide..

If you hold fast to the idea that your powerful car is the only way to cross the ocean, you will be in for a continual hack of trying to make your car float on water. It is much better to recognize that a good ship is the right vehicle for the ocean. Many of the challenges of building a compliant securities application on Ethereum are actually unnecessary. Securities regulation in any one country is complicated enough. Multi-jurisdictional capital markets transactions compound that complexity by several orders of magnitude. Application designers should not be distracted by trying to create their own chains; instead, the real achievement lies in making securities transactions fully compliant in all jurisdictions, promoting innovation in financial markets, enabling flexibility, minimizing process costs, and providing an Infrastructure of Trust to which all regulated entities are welcome. 

The world’s capital markets are too dispersed, complex, and huge for any one participant to dominate. Revolutionizing the capital markets is only possible through collaboration. 

www.InfrastructureofTrust.com

Finality, Settlement, and Validation: The Place to Start

One of the most important concepts in capital market transactions is settlement and finality. Even though the payment infrastructure gets the majority of airtime, settlement finality is just as, if not even more, important in the securities markets. In the public markets, the structure of securities and the clearance and settlement process is quite standardized. In the private markets, a segment that is three orders of magnitude larger than the public markets, standardization does not exist. Rather than an issue, this is the strength of the private markets, since both private companies and their investors need flexibility in securities contracts. Regardless of all this, settlement finality is equally important in both markets.

The issue of settlement finality actually applies to all legal contracts in the sense that terms and conditions cannot be stated in probabilistic terms. Would you sign an employment agreement where the fine print says there is a one-in-ten chance that you would not be paid every two weeks?

In justifying Polymath’s latest move to abandon Ethereum as their platform of choice for security tokens, Adam Dossa, Polymath’s head of blockchain, rightly observed, “At the center of contention is ethereum’s consensus mechanism, proof-of-work (PoW), which only offers a statistical guarantee of transaction finality.” As we pointed out early last year in one of our KoreBriefings where we evaluated Ethereum, “Finality [in Ethereum] is probabilistic and not guaranteed.” Probabilistic or even statistical finality in legal agreements just will not do.

In “Principles of Market Infrastructure,” a publication of the Bank of International Settlements, Principle 8 (Settlement Finality) requires that “An FMI [Financial Markets Infrastructure] should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide  final settlement intraday or in real-time.”

Note the definitive language of “clear and certain final settlement.” This excludes probabilistic or statistical finality. Melvin Eisenberg, Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, says, “The classical law approach to the certainty principle reflects the binary nature of classical contract law. Indeed, this approach is often referred to as the all-or-nothing rule.”1  Prof. Eisenberg goes on to provide examples of the “rejection of a probabilistic analysis.” While much of that treatment is related to damages due to non-performance of contracts, the concept of certain finality is quite relevant for securities transactions. This is a serious issue that has lately garnered a lot of attention.

Settlement finality is a statutory, regulatory, and contractual construct.2  Settlement is actually a two-step process: first is the operational settlement, which consists of all the steps using technology or otherwise to complete the process of trade, transfer, or corporate action. The second step is the legal settlement that happens when the regulatory framework provides the final approval, at which point a transaction is deemed to be fully settled. The problems due to the uncertain nature of operational settlement in Ethereum are well-known, even if generally ignored. The concept of legal settlement, on the other hand, simply does not even exist in the security token protocols based on Ethereum.

Blockchain technology must first achieve operational finality before the regulatory framework can certify legal finality. Public blockchains can only specify probabilistic and statistical finality. Smart contracts have to also provide for legal settlement. A permissioned blockchain such as Hyperledger Fabric is designed for guaranteed finality. The KoreProtocol of KoreChain, a blockchain application built on Fabric for managing the entire lifecycle of private securities, is designed to ensure legal finality also. One example of legal finality is that directors’ approval of private securities trades under certain conditions, as set forth in the shareholder agreement, is necessary before such trades are deemed to be final. The KoreProtocol is designed to capture this requirement and the KoreChain is designed to implement it.

While Polymath is the latest of the Ethereum advocates that has woken up to the fact that Ethereum isn’t the right blockchain platform for financial securities, they have not been the first. Several private companies, their securities attorneys, broker-dealers, and many other participants have noticed this deficiency and chosen to go with permissioned chains such as the KoreChain.

More significantly, Vitalik himself was the first to point this out way back in May of 2016 (over three years ago—a lifetime in crypto-space) in a blog post on Settlement Finality: “This concept of finality is particularly important in the financial industry, where institutions need to maximally quickly have certainty over whether or not the certain assets are, in a legal sense, “theirs”, and if their assets are deemed to be theirs, then it should not be possible for a random blockchain glitch to suddenly decide that the operation that made those assets theirs is now reverted and so their ownership claim over those assets is lost.”

Advocates of public blockchain also seem to be coming to the realization that when financial securities are exchanged between two parties, independent and unverified miners have no legal authority for validating the transaction. Parties who have no fiduciary responsibilities, no regulatory mandate, or any skin in the game cannot perform business validations. Would you ask a stranger in New Zealand to approve the transfer of your shares in a private company to your friend when you, your friend, and the private company are all domiciled in the USA? As Polymath’s Dossa observers, “How ethereum settles transactions through mining also came into consideration for Polymath. Since miners, who process and sign-off on transactions for a fee, can operate anywhere in the world, institutions could face government scrutiny if fees are traced back to a sanctioned country.” More to the point, securities law does not recognize approvals of securities transactions from parties who are not associated with or have any fiduciary responsibility for securities transactions.

Principles of settlement finality and authoritative validation of transactions remain some of the most important cornerstones of establishing trust in the financial markets infrastructure. It is up to the blockchain application designers to understand the spirit and intent of these principles and select technologies that facilitate the implementation of such principles rather than hinder them. It is up to the business participants (company management, securities attorneys, and broker-dealers) to recognize the importance of these principles and the limitations of some blockchain platforms.

Incentives often have unintended consequences. We see this happen often with children and pets. Public blockchains are all about decentralization, but in fact miners’ incentives have all but centralized the blockchains. In contrast, consider that within KoreChain we have not left the question of decentralization to the vagaries of unknown miners. Instead, the KoreChain is engineered for decentralization. It is an implementation of the Infrastructure of Trust that currently runs in production in twenty-three countries; in barebones minimal cruising mode, it is capable of handling approximately 10 billion transactions per year (~318 tps) with consensus on business validity. KoreChain’s architecture also makes it massively scalable with very little effect on performance. However, as Vitalik rightly points out, finality can never be 100% even if the technology can achieve absolute finality since the ultimate arbiter of finality is the legal system. For this reason, KoreChain includes KoreNodes that are owned and operated independently by regulated entities and regulators worldwide.

If you hold fast to the idea that your powerful car is the only way to cross the ocean, you will be in for a continual hack of trying to make your car float on water. It is much better to recognize that a good ship is the right vehicle for the ocean. Many of the challenges of building a compliant securities application on Ethereum are actually unnecessary. Securities regulation in any one country is complicated enough. Multi-jurisdictional capital markets transactions compound that complexity by several orders of magnitude. Application designers should not be distracted by trying to create their own chains; instead, the real achievement lies in making securities transactions fully compliant in all jurisdictions, promoting innovation in financial markets, enabling flexibility, minimizing process costs, and providing an Infrastructure of Trust to which all regulated entities are welcome. 

1 Foundational Principles of Contract Law, Melvin A. Eisenberg
2 http://yalejreg.com/nc/on-settlement-finality-and-distributed-ledger-technology-by-nancy-liao/

The world’s capital markets are too dispersed, complex, and huge for any one participant to dominate. Revolutionizing the capital markets is only possible through collaboration. 

www.InfrastructureofTrust.com

Many Rights Make the KoreProtocol Right

Over the last few weeks, we have seen the highly entertaining farce of Craig Wright claiming to be Satoshi Nakamoto by registering a copyright to the original bitcoin whitepaper and code. He may very well be Satoshi. However, registering a copyright does not confer an official recognition of identity. Wei Lu, CEO of Coinsumer, proved it. Reacting to the press releases and social media statements made by Craig Wright and his supporters, the US Copyright office took the extraordinary step of publicly refuting the claim that a copyright registration is the same as official & proven recognition. This prompted the subject line of Coindesk’s May 23rd Blockchain Bites email: “Wright is wrong.”

The public blockchains provide an endless source of fun. Whatever their faults, one can’t blame them for being boring. The responsible, permissioned chains are, in contrast, boring. KoreChain in particular is relatively dull to thrill-seeking outsiders, while extremely exciting to those who truly understand private capital markets and how the KoreProtocol is spearheading innovation for private issuers and investors.

The KoreProtocol defines many types of shareholder rights in private digital securities. These rights, some mandatory and some discretionary, are well-established in securities law and corporate law. The innovation and complexity of shareholders rights is only limited by the willingness and imagination of the participants. In the absence of automation and a single source of immutable truth, the implementation of rights can become a bureaucratic nightmare. This, more than anything, becomes a limiting factor for innovative contracts. By defining shareholder rights rigorously in the KoreProtocol and implementing the full workflows in KoreChain for their exercise, the KoreProtocol and the KoreChain take away the pain and effort of managing these rights. This opens up private capital markets to very flexible and complex shareholder agreements to suit the needs of the participants.

The KoreProtocol and the implementation within KoreChain include rights such as (to give a few of the more prominent examples):

  1. Voting/non-voting
  2. Financial participation in the form of dividends or revenue
  3. Distribution of revenue or dividends as cash, reinvested securities, or other forms of payment
  4. First right of refusal
  5. Tag-along rights
  6. Drag-along rights
  7. Pre-emptive rights

Each of these rights and their numerous variations have implications and consequences in secondary market trading and in corporate actions. The KoreProtocol provides a structured way to define these rights and their impact on securities transactions. The KoreProtocol implements complete end-to-end management of financial transaction processes, some of which may be very long-running.

The definition of protocol functions to handle all the complex scenarios in securities transactions is not a trivial undertaking. However, it is much easier than the actual implementation of the protocol since that requires handling long-running processes and making tradeoffs between manual and automated processes, data sharing mechanisms, and choice of endorsers. Every step of the process must be fully compliant with securities laws, corporate laws, and the provisions of the underlying contracts.

Trying to shoehorn securities transactions into inadequately defined protocols and delegating the implementations to someone else is to do the worldwide financial community a huge disservice. Implementing the rights of issuers and investors is a very complicated undertaking. For example, ERC-1404, in the words of its creators, “…solves for the compliance challenges that are part of the issuance process and beyond.”

How does ERC-1404 solve the problem of whether senders can send tokens to a receiver and whether receivers can receive tokens from a sender? By defining two functions: CanSend() and CanReceive(). The github code itself shows one function:

detectTransferRestriction(fromAddress, toAddress, numTokens) //I made it a bit readable.

With no trace of irony, the authors of this protocol point out that: “The specific logic covering who can send and receive can be configured outside the token contract itself.”

It is easy enough to write protocols as long as we leave the messy details of implementation to someone else!

In reality, the transfer of digital securities in a fully-compliant way is quite complicated. It is not just a matter of “who can send and receive”, but also a question of the circumstances under which securities can be transferred or not. There are complex workflows and numerous checks that need to be followed before any transfers, whether P2P, beneficial, or trade-related, can occur. The checks relate to the jurisdictions and exemptions under which the securities are issued, domicile of the participants, securities laws that govern all subsequent inter- and intra-jurisdictional securities transactions, corporate laws, the rights spelled out in the shareholders’ agreements, and the presence or absence of various types of events such as corporate actions, regulatory actions, and economic events.

To be fair, the creators of simplistic protocols may very well be aware of these complexities; however, the fact remains that they come nowhere near expressing the richness and complexity of global private capital markets. Also, they offer no guidelines for implementation or even a hint of the treacherous complexities.

At KoreConX and in KoreChain, knowing the business as we do by being an SEC-registered transfer agent, we chose to not only develop a comprehensive protocol but also implement it in all its complexity. Tapping into our worldwide partner network of securities lawyers, secondary market operators, broker-dealers, academics, and other thought-leaders, we tackled the problem by creating a legal base that incorporates much of the complexity of securities law and corporate law worldwide. This includes inter-jurisdictional transactions, Blue Sky laws in the US, Canadian provincial laws, etc.

Private capital markets provide enormous flexibility for creating complex shareholders’ agreements. We have so far not seen two offerings or agreements that are similar. The public markets are relatively standardized, which can be a strength in terms of offering liquidity at the expense of flexibility of contracts. Private companies and their investors want more control and flexibility.

By incorporating the various types of rights (some mandatory, some optional, and some that are negotiated) into the KoreProtocol and implementing through the KoreChain, our mission is to create the right infrastructure to preserve and foster innovation in global private capital markets while also furthering the cause of efficient liquidity.

www.koreconx.com

www.KoreConX.io

KoreChain & KoreContract

What is the KoreConX blockchain strategy & why choose KoreChain?

In this video, KoreConX Co-Founder and CEO, Oscar Jofre, and our Chief Scientist/CTO, Kiran Garimella, share the details of our permissioned blockchain. Built on the Hyperledger Fabric, it is secure and governed with the ability to have full lifecycle management of contracts for tokenized securities for global private capital markets.

 

Forking – the New ‘F’ Word in Blockchain

Forking seems to be an integral part of the Blockchain architecture. This is due to Blockchain’s decentralized nature and the need to establish systemic trust among multiple participants (who are generally unknown to each other and therefore untrustworthy by definition).

To most of the non-technical population and a fair amount of the technical population as well, the forking phenomenon can be baffling and sound like a soap opera. The reasons for forking range from upgrades to the blockchain (for implementing some technical features such as expanded block size), migration of signatures to extended blocks (the SegWit fork on bitcoin), and disagreements on how to handle errors or losses.

To the extent that a chain relies on decentralization, operational forking is inevitable, since all transactions need to be validated and accepted by everybody or by a quorum. The volume of transactions can become huge. The way miners select transactions from the pool to validate and create blocks results in non-determinism. Different validators end up working on different blocks, causing little sub-chains to sprout like weeds in a garden. Eventually, one of the blocks wins out and its branch becomes the official continuation of the chain.

What happens to the other sub-chains? They wither and die. This is an integral part of the technology and perfectly proper, since it is a result of the inherent non-determinism in the generation of transactions and in the selection of transactions to validate. Remember, there is no central authority that coordinates all this, hence the need for a process of continual discovery of the most valid block and the most valid corresponding branch of the chain.

Unfortunately, regardless of the technical necessities, all this sounds like the result of squabbles in the blockchain community. The major forks in the Bitcoin and Ethereum communities, such as Bitcoin Cash and Ethereum Classic, are indeed serious disagreements with proposed changes. Besides the ever-present threat of malicious intent, these disagreements occur between well-meaning participants. In traditional centralized systems (whether software or not), these disagreements also exist, but they get resolved one way or the other before deploying the solution to the users. In some dispersed systems, such as professional associations, the protocol for change management is well-established. However, disputes occur in public blockchains while the chain is “in production” and participants can steer the chain to express their preference. It’s a bit like giving uncooperative front-seat passengers their own steering wheels.

Decentralized systems are double-edged swords, or should we say, spiny hedgehogs? Decentralization brings freedom from central authority. Whether this is viewed as good or bad depends on the issue at hand. But the one thing decentralization guarantees is a lot of debate, some chaos, sometimes no resolution, and (hopefully less often) a break-away of a splinter group in the form of a forked chain.

Decentralization is not necessarily good for everything, every time, and everybody. When pushed to the mat, most people would rather give up privacy for security and safety. Similarly, I suspect most would choose control and certainty over change, chaos, and confusion. As they say in the Six Sigma community, variance is worse than a bad mean. The possibility of forking in blockchains introduces an element of uncertainty that is less in users’ control or understanding than the uncertainty of change driven by a centralized governing body.

Blockchain is not one tool. The right flavor of blockchain must be applied correctly to the appropriate problem. Just as you can’t eat soup with a fork, you can’t deal with the soup of regulated securities with a forked chain, or more accurately, with a spoon that you don’t own or control, and which can splinter into a fork at any time.